
Ectasis and Redemption
Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History (1940) is contemporaneous with Miki’s Logic of Imagination (1937-1938 and 1939-1943). There are significant resemblances in their historical thought. Both Benjamin and Miki reject causal conceptions of history, being critical of historical formalism. They both inquire into certain openture of time called the present (or what Benjamin calls “a monad”). They conceive of philosophy from the standpoint of action rather than that of knowledge. However, despite these similarities, whereas Benjamin’s Theses revolve around redemption of the subdued, Miki pursues an ecstatic/techno-ontological conception of history. This study clarifies both Benjamin’s and Miki’s theses on historical openture in their texts dating from the overlapping period. Despite his recurring statement that an action should be understood as creation of things, Miki’s presentist thought is essentially metaphysical rather than physical or material. Since we live in the world in which fiction bears more importance than material objects, metaphysics for Miki is related to the faculty of imagination. Therefore, unlike for Benjamin, the standpoint of action for Miki does not necessarily entail a materialist view. This (potentially contradictory) idea of action cuts across Miki’s philosophy of history and imagination. It explains the difference between Benjamin’s redemptive and Miki’s ecstatic presentism. Miki examines this correlation between imagination and metaphysics throughout Logic of Imagination.